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PRIMARY ISSUES IN
COMPENSATION LITIGATION
COMMISSIONER J. RANDOLPH WARD*
I. SCOPE
This Article seeks to aid the practicing attorney with hearing
preparation and research by identifying fundamental issues-
those matters that should be stipulated, or will be litigated, in vir-
tually every workers' compensation case-and the grounds on
which they are most commonly controverted. Recent amendments
to the operative statutes are noted.1
II. LITIGATION CONTEXT
Counsel accustomed to other forums will find contrasts in pro-
cedure before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, growing
out of its "quasi-judicial" or "administrative" character,2 as it adju-
dicates cases arising under the Workers' Compensation Act,
N.C.G.S. Chapter 97, Article I (hereinafter "the Act").' These
include discovery rules that are less restrictive concerning medi-
* Commissioner Ward was appointed to the North Carolina Industrial
Commission in 1989. He is also a permanent member of the United States
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference; is on the executive committe for the
Southern Association of Workers' Compensation Administrators; and is a
member of the North Carolina Bar Association's Dispute Resolution Committee,
Arbitration Subcommittee. Commissioner Ward received his B.A. and J.D. from
Wake Forest University.
1. Particularly note the Technical Amendments of 1991, S.B. 434, ch. 703
[hereinafter, "1991 Amendments"], and the Workers' Compensation Reform Act
of 1994, S.B. 906, ch. 679 [hereinafter, "1994 Act"].
2. Winslow v. Carolina Conference Assoc., 211 N.C. 571, 579, 191 S.E. 403,
408 (1937).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-91 (1991). The Commission is also "constituted a
court" for the purpose of determining claims under the State Tort Claims Act,
(see N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 143, art. 31), and generally uses court rules in those
hearings. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291(a) (1994); 143-300 (1993). Its procedure is
more "administrative" (summary) in handling claims under the Law-
Enforcement Officers', Firemen's, Rescue Squad Workers' and Civil Air Patrol
Members' Death Benefits Act (N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 143, art. 12A), and the
Childhood Vaccine-Related Injury Compensation Program (N.C. GEN. STAT. ch.
130A, art. 17).
443
1
Ward: Primary Issues in Compensation Litigation
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
cal information, 4 and more restrictive otherwise; 5 pre-hearing
agency calculation of the "average weekly wage" on which most
awards are based;6 procedures that allow the hearing record to
accumulate in phases by submission of documents following the
"live" hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, including submis-
sion of virtually all expert testimony by deposition;7 and, require-
ments that all settlements,' the plaintiff's attorney's fees,9 and
charges for medical compensation1 ° be submitted to the Commis-
sion for approval. On the other hand, while the Commission is not
bound to conform its litigation rules and procedures 11 to conven-
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-27 (1991); Workers' Compensation Rules of the
North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule 607 (West 1995).
5. Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rules 605(c), 606 and 608 (West 1995).
6. See I.C. Form 22; see also Workers' Compensation Rules of the North
Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule 103(1) (West 1995).
7. Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule
612 (West 1995).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991) and § 97-81 (Supp. 1994); Workers'
Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rules 501-503
(1995).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-90(c) (Supp. 1994).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(19), 97-26, 97-90(a) (Supp. 1994). The definition
of "medical compensation," created in the 1991 Amendments, combined the pre-
existing definitions of medical treatment in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-19
(subcontractors), 97-25 (medical treatment and supplies), 97-29 (total disability),
97-59 (occupational disease); and 97-90(a) (medical fee approval). For an
example of the dissonance among these definitions, see Roberts v. ABR Assoc.,
101 N.C. App. 135, 143, 398 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1990). The language concerning
subsequent "artificial members" was added by the 1994 Act. The '94 Act
exempted charges to employers of their "managed care" organizations. It also
codified the Commission's long-standing rule that health care providers may not
bill the parties to a dispute over liability for their medical treatment while the
case pends, and tolled the statute of limitations on a suit to recover these fees for
that period. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-90(e) (Supp. 1994). The 1991 Amendments
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-90(a)) and the 1994 Act (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(g) and
97-90(a)) empowered the Commission to give employers or carriers leave to apply
the Commission's published Fee Schedule themselves, without submitting the
bill to the Commission for that purpose. This has been done under an electronic
transmission project that began in 1992; and, pursuant to rules published
January 18, 1995, without any contemporaneous notice to the Commission since
February 15, 1995.
11. For a general discussion, see "Industrial Commission Rules and Practices"
Workers' Compensation 1993, Wake Forest School of Law (CLE) 1993, pp. 120-
233.
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tional evidentiary rules 2 and motions practice, 13 the Commis-
sion's use of these has generally met with judicial approval, and
they are normally applied in Commission hearings. 14
In fact, having evolved before the New Deal and post-World
War II rise of bureaucracies, comp litigation may be more similar
to the courts than other administrative hearing systems, in both
its method of adjudication' 5 and in its place in the decision mak-
ing process.' 6 Perhaps because of this, the courts have occasion-
ally questioned,' 7 or ignored' s the Commission's use of its special
knowledge and experience, which elsewhere has been considered a
primary reason for administrative forums. 19 But in general, Com-
12. N.C. R. Civ. P. 1; Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 137, 337
S.E.2d 477, 483 (1985).
13. Conklin v. Hennis Freight Lines, 27 N.C. App. 260, 261, 218 S.E.2d 484
(1975); Tindall v. Furniture Co., 216 N.C. 306, 311, 4 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1939).
14. See, e.g., Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Company, 214 N.C. 589, 595,
200 S.E. 438, 440-41 (1938) (hearsay evidence); In Re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 138,
156 S.E. 791, 795 (1931) (contempt); Hogan, 315 N.C. at 137, 337 S.E.2d at 483
(N.C. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(6)). The most prominent exception is the lack of dispositive
motions on the pleadings (N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56), since form notices (I.C.
Forms 18, 33 and 33R) are used in place of formal pleadings.
15. "The common law exclusionary rules of evidence are [neither] based in
Constitutional interdictions" nor required by the Federal Administrative
Procedures Act." Wilapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 1949).
16. Final decisions by the Full Commission - typically heard on appeal from
an Opinion and Award by one of its Deputy Commissioners following a section
97-84 hearing - are reviewable in the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-85 (1991), 97-86 (Supp. 1994); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt
& Paving Co., 337 N.C. 785, 787-88, 448 S.E.2d 380, 381-82 (1994). Compare,
however, decisions by the Office of Administrative Hearings, which are
recommendations to the secretaries of executive departments, whose decisions
may be contested in Superior Court. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-22 to
150B-52 (1991 & Supp. 1994). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-34, 150B-36;
150B-45, 150B-20 (1991) and State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate
Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 264, 300 S.E.2d 586, 587-88, cert. denied, 308 N.C.
548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983) (decided under corresponding provisions of Chapter
150A regarding hearing officers, now administrative law judges). The
Commission is, appropriately, exempted from the Administrative Procedures
Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c)(4) (Supp. 1994).
17. See Church v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 104 N.C. App. 411, 418, 409 S.E.2d
715, 721 (1991) (Parker, J., dissenting).
18. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
336 N.C. 200, 222, 443 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1994).
19. A "significant distinction between judicial and administrative
adjudications is that agency hearings tend to produce evidence of general
conditions as distinguished from facts relating solely to the respondent." G.
Robinson, The Administrative Process, pp. 31, 180, and 761-62 (West Publishing
445
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mission knowledge gained outside the formal hearing record has
been taken into account,20 and led to some deference to Commis-
sion interpretations of the Act.2 '
Much of the Commission's claims processing is truly adminis-
trative-that is, without adjudication-reflecting the success, in
the vast majority of cases, of the effort to achieve a system of
"swift and sure" compensation for the employee through limited
liability for the employer, without regard to fault, unburdened by
litigation.22 In the fiscal year 1990-91, there were 244,616 inju-
ries reported to the Commission - 82,355 by North Carolina
Industrial Commission Form 19's, triggering the opening of files,
and the remainder reported as "minor medical- but only 4,157
of those requests were for a hearing over any dispute.23
1974). This difference is attributable to "one of the original justifications for
administrative agencies - the development of policy." Id. This is done primarily
through rule-making because "acting only by adjudication.. .is cumbersome and
costly" and rule-making allows "all interested persons - not just a few main
parties - an opportunity to participate." Id. However, "the genius of the
common law is its inductive methodology of moving to general principles only
after testing them on concrete facts." Id. Consequently, adopting the judicial role
is frequently the most "useful vehicle for developing and announcing precise
rules," even for an agency with administrative powers and responsibilities. Id.
Concerning the role of rule-making under the Act, and the Commission's rule-
making authority, see generally "Industrial Commission Rules and Practices"
Workers' Compensation 1993, Wake Forest School of Law (CLE), 1993.
20. Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 121, 195 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1956);
Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 140, 181 S.E.2d 588, 594, (1971);
Church, 104 N.C. App. at 418, 409 S.E.2d at 721.
21. Deese v. Southern Lawn & Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 278, 293 S.E.2d
140, 143, (1982). Concerning statutory interpretation, see "Procedure and the
Workers' Compensation Act of 1994", Workers' Compensation Selected Topics
1994, Wake Forest School of Law (CLE), pp. 285-286-(1994).
22. Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 709, 295 S.E.2d 458
(1982).
23. The 1994 Act codified the Commission's rule that injuries requiring
substantial medical compensation - presently more than $2,000 in billings by
providers - must also be reported to the Commission, which currently is
receiving approximately 95,000 of these reports per year. A substantial number
of these actually fall outside these parameters, and are sent because submission
triggers Commission scrutiny of medical charges under the Fee Schedule. The
student of our system must be wary of statistics without a full explanation of how
they were gathered. This is particularly true of the Commission's biannual
report, in which most of the numbers are a by-product of other functions. In one
recent year, Full Commission decisions were underreported by more than half,
because only those set for oral argument were counted. In recent years, the
statistics department has not had the staff to "close" and extract information
446 [Vol. 17:443
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Once the Commission is found to have jurisdiction of a con-
tested case,' 4 it is a fundamental tenet of interpretation 5 that the
Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its broad intent to
provide compensation for employees sustaining an injury arising
out of and in the course of their employment, and no "technical or
strained construction" should be given to defeat this purpose.26
Perhaps reflecting the relative informality of the "quasi-judicial"
Commission, and its "power and authority", the court of appeals
recently has held 28 that the Commission may extend the time for
filing an appeal from the Commission to that court on the grounds
of excusable neglect. 29 The holding appears to give the Commis-
sion a power to step over the statutory appeal rules akin to the
court's writ of certiorari power.3 0
The 1994 Act was precipitated by an unsustainable rate of
premium cost increases.3 ' The debate and controversy began in
from all concluded cases, and the criteria for selecting those analyzed varied from
"first reached" to "most serious", etc., from year to year. Section 97-92(a)
requires the employer to record all injuries - traditionally defined as those
requiring a doctor's examination or treatment off the workplace premises - and
report those causing more than one (1) day's absence from work to the
Commission. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-92(a) (Supp. 1994).
24. Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 19, 29 S.E.2d 137, 142 (1944).
25. Deese, 306 N.C. at 277, 293 S.E.2d at 142-43.
26. Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 592-93
(1930); Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 576, 336 S.E.2d 47,
53 (1985).
27. See Hogan, 315 N.C. at 137, 337 S.E.2d at 483.
28. Allen v. Food Lion, Inc., IC No. 066892, 25 October 1993, rev'd, 117 N.C.
App. 289, 291-92, 450 S.E.2d 571-72 (1994). Compare Currin-Dillehay Bldg.
Supply, Inc. v. Frasier, 100 N.C. App. 188, 189, 394 S.E.2d 683, 683, appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 327 N.C. 633, 339 S.E.2d 326 (1990) (Appeal
dismissed for failure to meet "jurisdictional" requirement of timely written
appeal, although oral notice was given in open court.) with Taylor v. Foy, 91 N.C.
App. 82, 84-85, 370 S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (1988), aff'd, 324 N.C. 331, 377 S.E.2d
745 (1989) (per curiam) (dismissing due to late filing of stipulated record on
appeal).
29. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
30. See N.C. R. App. P. 21.
31. According to data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance,
our State was 38th among fifty-one jurisdictions in compensation premium costs,
but eighth in the rate of increase - 57.39% for the period 1986-1991. Due to the
lag in the "development" of statistics utilized by the carriers, these reflected
changes in the system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The single most
powerful "cost drive" was medical inflation, with hospitals leading the way. In
1989-91, the per day cost of inpatient treatment for compensation claimants rose
29.7%, 17.6% and 21.0%, respectively - 4% to 7% higher than the hospitals'
447
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earnest after the insurance industry, through the North Carolina
Rate Bureau, requested a 58.4% increase, and then implemented
a 40.3% increase effective January 1, 1993.32 Initially, benefits
came under pressure, but more as a logical approach to the cost
problem than any conviction that they were too high. As both
business and labor withstood important political tests of
strength-and came to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other's
concerns-attention turned to their common interest in strength-
ening the system's ability to achieve its primary ends. The myriad
"technical" provisions that make up the 1994 Act were assembled
by people familiar with the system, its needs, and its defects.
Unlike many "crisis" states, North Carolina did not roll back bene-
fit levels or eliminate important grounds for eligibility.3
Undoubtedly, this is due in part to the fact that North Carolina
was, and is, a comparatively low cost state for compensation
insurance, ranking forty among fifty-one jurisdictions in 1995. 34
Most of the benefit enhancements resulting from both legislation
and caselaw survived, but with definitional or procedural bounda-
ries that fit them into the overall scheme of the system.
35
III. COMMISSION ADJUDICATION
All of the judicial authority and jurisdiction of the North Car-
olina Industrial Commission resides in its Commissioners, who
distribute the dispute resolution tasks by appointment and
general rate of inflation. (Source: N.C. Database Commission.) As the
differential suggests, a primary problem appeared to be overutiization, which
the Commission sought to address with systems that paid "by course of
treatment" rather than "by procedure" - first per diem (struck down by the
courts, see infra note 198), then under the 1994 Act and linkage to the State
Health Plan (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(b) (Supp. 1994)), with "diagnostic related
groups" (DRGs).
32. The Commissioner of Insurance approved a 23.4% increase, but the law
permits the carriers to charge and hold in escrow a larger amount while the rate
case pends in the courts. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-36-25(b) (1994).
33. Since 1990, according to the National Foundation for Employment
Compensation and Workers' Compensation (3/31/95), over twenty-five states
have enacted major reform bills aimed at bringing down spiraling workers'
compensation costs.
34. "Compensation Premium Rate Ranking, 1994", Oregon Dep't of Consumer
& Business Serv. (1995).
35. For a more detailed discussion of the debate leading up to the passage of
the 1994 Act, see generally "Procedure and the Workers' Compensation Act of
1994", Workers' Compensation Selected Topics 1994, Wake Forest School of Law
(CLE) (1994).
[Vol. 17:443448
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assignment. 36 Because the agency is a single unit,3 7 either a Com-
missioner or Deputy Commissioner may conduct the initial trial-
like hearing,38 a Deputy Commissioner may sit on the "Full Com-
mission" review of a hearing officer's decision,39 a Commissioner
or the Full Commission may take and decide a question at a stage
when it normally would be decided by one of the Commission's
employees,40 and while the hearing officer's decision is final if a
Full Commission review is not sought, the appeal to the court of
appeals "for errors of law" can only be taken from a final decision
of the Full Commission. 41 The Commission may not delegate
administrative duties to a subset of its members where the statute
gives the responsibility to "the Commission".42 For instance, the
Act did not permit the Commission to formalize the Chairman's
traditional role as personnel manager for the agency by delega-
tion;4 3 this was later accomplished by statute. 44 But otherwise,
the Commission has broad discretion to organize its employees
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-78(b) (1991) and 98-79(b) (Supp. 1994);
Hedgecock v. Frye, 1 N.C. App. 369, 372, 161 S.E.2d 647, 649-50 (1968) (Chief
Claims Examiner a "deputy" for approval of agreements.).
37. Compare the Industrial Commission with the General Court of Justice,
with various levels having separate original jurisdiction over different types of
cases. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-25; 7A-240 to 7A-254; 7A-271 and 7A-272 (1989
& Supp. 1994).
38. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-79 (Supp. 1994) and 97-84 (1991).
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (1991).
40. See, e.g., Jackson v. Blue Ridge Temporaries, I.C. No. 071377, 16 Oct.
1991; Hyatt v. Temporary Employee Serv., Inc., I.C. No. 073669, 28 Sept. 1992.
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Supp. 1994); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt,
337 N.C. 785, 788, 448 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1994); Watkins v. City of Wilmington,
290 N.C. 276, 280, 221 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1976); Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co.,
256 N.C. 175, 182, 123 S.E.2d 608, 614 (1962); Craver v. Dixie Furniture Co., 115
N.C. App. 570, 580-81, 447 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1994); Apple v. Guilford Co., 84 N.C.
App. 679, 682, 353 S.E.2d 641, 644, rev'd on other grounds, 321 N.C. 98, 361
S.E.2d 588 (1987); Lynch v. Kahn Constr. Co., 41 N.C. App. 127, 129, 254 S.E.2d
236, 238, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 298, 259 S.E.2d 914 (1979).
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (Supp. 1994) (medical fee schedule);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-72 (1991) (appointment of advisory medical committee);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80 (Supp. 1994) (rule-making).
43. Opinion of Attorney General to J. Randolph Ward, Commissioner, NCIC,
60 N.C.A.G. 42 (Nov. 8, 1990) (The query was, "may the Full Commission
delegate the authority and sole responsibility for [personnel] matters to the
Chairman of the Commission?.").
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-77 was amended to this general effect in 1991 (see
S.B. 286, 1991 N.C. SESS. LAws ch. 264 and 483), and again in 1993 (see S.B.
1505, 1993 N.C. SEsS. LAws ch. 769 and 870).
449
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and their tasks according to needs, priorities and available
resources.
45
The Act empowers a single Commissioner or Deputy Commis-
sioner to hold the trial-like hearing,4 6 and that hearing officer's
decision will be final unless the disappointed party seeks a review
before the "Full Commission,"47 which sits in panels of three to
resolve the appeals. While the focus of this "review" may be lim-
ited to issues raised by the parties, 48 the Full Commission's pow-
ers go beyond the appellate standard of review to include those of
a trier of fact,49 and indeed there is no final finding of fact in a case
appealed to the Full Commission until made by that body, either
originally or by adoption.50 In recent years, over one-third of the
Deputy Commissioner's decisions have been appealed.5 1
The Claims Department handles some two thousand North
Carolina Industrial Commission Form 21 and Form 26 agree-
ments weekly, and will track the required paperwork for compen-
sation under the new "payment without prejudice" or "direct pay"
provisions of the 1994 Act.52 Until the recent advent of the
Ombudsman program,53 they also responded to a large number of
basic questions from claimants. The Chief Claims Examiner
decides motions to change physicians or treatment, based on docu-
45. See generally Frye, 1 N.C. App. at 372, 161 S.E.2d at 649-50; see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 97-78(b) (1991), 97-79(b), (c), (e) and (f) (Supp. 1994), and 97-80(b),
(g) and (h) (Supp. 1994).
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1991).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (1991).
48. See Maley, 214 N.C. at 593, 200 S.E. at 441; Brewer, 256 N.C. at 181-82,
123 S.E.2d at 613-14.
49. See Watkins, 290 N.C. at 280, 225 S.E.2d at 580.
50. See Martin, 337 N.C. at 788, 448 S.E.2d at 382.
51. D. Ballentyne, Workers' Compensation in North Carolina, Workers'
Compensation Research Inst., p. 66 (1993).
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-18(d), 97-82(b), and 97-47.1 (Supp. 1994).
Effective January 1, 1995, defendants are authorized to pay compensation
without an agreement/admission of liability, and cease within ninety days
without the Commission's leave, if they deny the claim on compensability or
liability grounds, only; that is, defendants cannot withhold benefits for leverage
in disputes over the amount of compensation due, when the employee should
return to work, non-cooperation with treatment, etc. Defendants typically do
this - jokingly called "renting the case" in other jurisdictions - to get more
time to investigate without causing adversarial attitudes to develop or triggering
litigation.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-79(f) (Supp. 1994); see also infra note 63 and
accompnaying text.
450 [Vol. 17:443
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mentary evidence submitted by the parties.54 The Executive Sec-
retary's office handles routine motions in cases not assigned to a
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner for hearing, such as con-
ventional discovery motions and fee approval requests, as well as
approval of the compromise settlement agreements- generally
referred to as "clinchers".
55
The Act anticipates that compensation payments will begin
shortly after an injury that disables an employee for more than
seven (7) days.5 6 Since the length of disability cannot be known
at that point, the Industrial Commission Form 21 agreement pro-
vides that defendants are obligated to continue the payments dur-
ing "necessary weeks". As the Commission approves these
agreements, thus making them its own award,57 it falls to the
Commission to interpret whether its award has been satisfied
when the parties disagree over whether disability continues.5"
Most systems basing payment of benefits on a changeable status
or condition have summary termination proceedings to provide an
interim decision, pending a full evidentiary hearing, when evi-
dence is brought forward that the condition or status has
changed. 59 Ours assumed an unusual prominence in the early
1990's due to our case backlog at the hearing level, and the delay
between the time the dispute arose and a hearing before a Deputy
Commissioner empowered to settle the issue de novo.60 The 1994
54. These issues may also be raised in an informal hearing on termination
("Form 24"). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1(e) (Supp. 1994).
55. See Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rule 502 (West 1995).
56. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18 (Supp. 1994).
57. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
58. Some defendants have paid benefits without an agreement in order to
unilaterally terminate payments without Commission intervention. This has
been discouraged by refusing the defendant credit for such payments if liability
is eventually imposed, effectively making them pay the compensation twice. See
Raffield v. United States Air, Inc., I.C. No. 136625, 6 Dec. 1994.
59. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Dillard v. Virginia
Indus. Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1991); Workers' Compensation Rules of the
North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule 404 (West 1995). The delay reached its
nadir in 1989 at an average of thirteen months between the filing of a request
and a hearing, up from 11.8 months the previous year. Ballentyne, supra note
51, at 87. It is a measure of how thin the Commission's ranks were that this
"spike" was precipitated in part by the resignation of one Deputy Commissioner,
the disability of a second, the inexperience of a newly-hired third, and the
decision that the Chief Deputy would cease holding hearings and do only
administrative work. Our staff of Deputy Commissioners was boosted by the
9
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Act codified the Commission's Industrial Commission Form 24
procedure, and with the luxury of additional personnel to arrange
and hear from the parties firsthand (rather than solely by docu-
mentary evidence), improved it significantly by providing for
"informal hearings" by telephone.6 '
Harkening back to the original informality of the comp sys-
tem, and responding to the glut and delay of modern litigation,62
the Commission has created two mechanisms for consensual reso-
lution of disputes. Based on the universal observation of workers'
compensation administrators and researchers that a significant
number of cases end up in formal litigation because of misunder-
standings or ignorance of the law, the Commission has started an
Ombudsman program with personnel assigned solely to respond
to questions and resolve minor disputes through information and
discussion.63 Use of "mediation"-the structured assisted settle-
ment conference technique adopted in 1991 in our superior
courts-was encouraged in the comp system beginning in 1992,64
and was formally adopted in 1993.65 Initial results are somewhat
more favorable than the courts, with some three-quarters (3/4) of
the cases sent to Mediation settled before or during the confer-
ence. The impression is that more cases are settling, and cer-
Legislature from twelve to fourteen in 1989, to sixteen in 1992, and to twenty in
1994.
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1(d) and (e) (Supp. 1994). For the history and
development of this proceeding, its statutory basis and the due process
considerations, see Hepler v. Red Bird Cab, I.C. No. 859934, 30 Apr. 1993.
62. For a discussion of the litigation reduction goals of the system, and
current stresses, see "Workers' Compensation: Historical Overview", Workers'
Compensation and State Tort Claims: Becoming Conversant, N.C. Bar
Foundation, (CLE) 1994.
63. One Ombudsman position was authorized by the 1992 Legislature, but
lost to Administration budget cuts in early 1993, before it could be filled. The
program was authorized specifically by statute in the 1994 Act (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-79(f) (Supp. 1994)), and four were hired in March, 1995. Similar programs
have been started for comp systems in fourteen states in recent years, according
to a March, 1995 IAIABC survey. Oregon's - one of the oldest and most
successful - was the prototype for ours. The prohibition against hearing
representation in the statute was a reaction to a practice in Texas.
64. The N.C. Bar Foundation's CLE program "Mediation for Workers'
Compensation Counsel/Workers' Compensation Law for Mediators", September,
1992, was planned and presented by your author and leading members of the
compensation bar, and attended by representatives from firms administering
well over half the insurance and self-insurance in force in the State, as well as
members of the Bar and mediators interested in handling our cases.
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80(c) (Supp. 1994).
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tainly they are settling faster, freeing the Commission's resources
to deal more expeditiously with the remainder. 6 The technique
was used most frequently on a voluntary basis in cases involving
complex or uncertain issues, or both, and multiple parties, such as
those with multiple defendants, Woodson claims, or third-party
tort-feasor claims with employer negligence issues, and it is likely
to be particularly valued by parties seeking to resolve multiple
issues without going to all of the forums with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to settle them.67 In workers' compensation, liability is clearer
and "time is money" in a very concrete sense (currently, up to $478
per week), and, perhaps to a greater degree than other litigation
systems, "alternative dispute resolution" techniques are likely to
become more important.68
The Full Commission decisions are reviewable in the North
Carolina Court of Appeals "for errors of law".69 The "well-estab-
lished rule concerning the role of the appellate court in reviewing
an appeal from the Industrial Commission is that the court 'is lim-
ited to determination of (1) whether the findings of fact are sup-
ported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of
law are supported by the findings.' "70 While the Commission is
not required to make findings as to each fact presented by the evi-
dence, it is required to make specific findings of fact with respect
to those crucial facts upon which the question of the plaintiff's
right to compensation depends.7 '
66. Mediation has also been observed to narrow issues in a significant number
of cases that are not settled, leading to more settlements before trial, and less
complex hearings. A full analysis of the data is not available at this writing.
67. A workplace injury can spawn concurrent disputes concerning workers'
compensation and unemployment compensation (N.C. Employment Security
Comm.), wrongful discharge (N.C. Dept. of Labor), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm.), a Woodson claim,
see infra note 164 and accompanying text, (superior court), third-party tort-
feasors and compensation liens (superior or district courts), Family Medical
Leave Act, and age discrimination (federal courts).
68. Your author believes that "early neutral evaluation" may be the next
"ADR" technique to find favor in the comp system.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Supp. 1994).
70. See Watkins v. City of Asheville, 99 N.C. App. 302, 303, 392 S.E.2d 754,
755 (1990) (citing Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 331, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678
(1980); Guy v. Burlington Industries, 74 N.C. App. 685, 689, 329 S.E.2d 685
(1985)).
71. See Gaines v. L.D. Swain & Son, 33 N.C. App. 575, 579, 235 S.E.2d 856
(1977).
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When the Commission's jurisdiction to hear a claim for com-
pensation is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court has the
power and duty to find "jurisdictional facts", and is not bound by
the Commission's. 72 Otherwise, "the findings of fact by the Com-
mission, which are non-jurisdictional, are conclusive on appeal to
the court of appeals", even if the evidence might have supported
findings to the contrary. 73 Appeals from decisions of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Commission cases are heard in the
North Carolina Supreme Court on discretionary review and on
review of decisions by divided panels of the court of appeals. 4
IV. RESEARCH SOURCES
For an area of law of its present importance,75 there has been
a remarkable lack of practice aids and both primary and secon-
dary sources for research of particular issues. The lack of such
materials was due primarily to the low amounts in controversy in
compensation cases. Prior to the 1973 amendments, the maxi-
mum weekly cash benefit was eighty dollars - with limits of four
hundred weeks of cash benefits and $32,500.00 in any one case-
and the employee was entitled to medical treatment for only ten
days following the injury, unless additional treatment would effect
a cure or shorten the period of disability.76 The most dramatic
growth in the value of compensation was more recent. Between
1980 and 1991 benefits paid annually jumped from $131 million to
$545 millionan inflation-adjusted 152 percent.77 Thereafter,
average premiums (after settlement and adjustment) increased
15.8% for 1992, 33.0% for 1993, 9.3% for 1994, and (following pas-
sage of the 1994 Act) 0% for 1995.78
72. See Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163 S.E. 569 (1932).
73. See Holleman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 245, 159 S.E.2d 874, 878
(1986); Bailey v. Smokey Mtn. Enter., 65 N.C. App. 134, 136, 308 S.E.2d 489
(1983); Priddy v. Blue Bird Cab Co., Inc., 9 N.C. App. 291, 298, 176 S.E.2d 26
(1970).
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-30 and 7A-31 (1989); N.C. R. App. P. 15 and 16.
75. There is currently compensation insurance and self-insurance in force in
North Carolina with a premium value of approximately $1.2 billion.
76. See Little v. Penn Ventilator, 317 N.C. 206, 211-13, 345 S.E.2d 204, 207-
08 (1986).
77. Ballentyne, supra note 51, at 32.
78. The settlement between the Rate Bureau and the Commissioner of
Insurance setting the amounts for 1993 and 1994 was made late in the year, so
most employers actually paid 40.3% more in 1993 and 3.6% more in 1994.
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The Commission published its decisions in official reporters
from its creation in 1929 through 1934 in three volumes, and then
ceased. 79 Anecdotally, this was due to some combination of the
Depression, and the belief that court opinions would adequately
update the existing body of case law on what was still considered a
simple and finite subject. Indeed, the statutes on occupational
disease, 80 and many of the other changes that have made the Act
more complex, were added later. There is a single volume treatise
concentrating on North Carolina compensation law which offers a
broad overview. 8 ' The nation's outstanding treatise in the field,
written in Durham, is frequently helpful in addressing the less
common factual situations and statutory interpretations.8 2 Publi-
cation of case synopses of Commission decisions by Lawyers
Weekly, and copies of full text opinions offered through their case
service, 3 have been extraordinarily important due to the lack of
other sources, and a depth of understanding of the subject matter
rarely associated with periodicals. Committees of the plaintiff and
defense Bar organizations have been particularly valuable to prac-
titioners in keeping them informed of the significance and impact
of developments in the field, and in influencing their direction.
The Commission sells a desk book prepared by the Michie Com-
pany that includes the annotated Act, the Commission's rules,
name indexes of the Courts' compensation cases, and other related
material. The Commission periodically publishes a Rating Guide
and Fee Schedule assembled for medical providers that contains
information that is sometimes useful to counsel. Practitioners
periodically obtain from the Commission updated sets of the Com-
missions rules8 4 and forms,8 5 which have undergone significant
changes in the wake of the 1994 Act. There are some old (and
obscure) sources that can be invaluable in understanding the
79. These are in the Supreme Court library, and are cited in annotations to
Michie's older editions of the statutes as, e.g., "II I.C. 123".
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 to 97-76 (1991 & Supp. 1994), in their initial
form, were enacted 1935.
81. L. JERNIGAN, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1994).
82. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, (Matthew Bender 1995).
83. Seven (7) of the fifty "best sellers" in 1994 were Commission cases.
84. The Commission's workers' compensation rules are cited, "I.C. Rule 101".
These are also published in the annual Michie Annotated Rules of North
Carolina provided to subscribers to the General Statutes, and in West's annual
North Carolina Rules of Court - State.
85. See Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rule 103 (West 1995) (listing of forms).
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intent of many of the ancient but surviving portions of the Act.
The cases in Commission's reporters were authored by people
involved with passage of the Act and its initial administration.
Students of the Act will find the May, 1929 Bulletin, containing
the initial rules,86 a discussion of the purposes of the Act, and an
outline of procedures, to be a fascinating document. A published
thesis87 concerning the Act's creation and first decade, based
largely on interviews with members of the Commission and their
employees during that era, fleshes out the concerns and purposes
that preoccupied the framers of the Act. The most authoritative
recent study of our compensation system, drawing on sources from
all its sectors, is the Workers' Compensation Research Institute's
1993 "administrative inventory".8
With the advent of electronic bulletin boards and powerful
word search programs, Industrial Commission cases will be more
accessible, and thus they are cited throughout this article when
they augment or illustrate the point. Lawyers Weekly now has all
its back issues on disk, and the Commission is beginning to save
its cases on electronic media. The Commission is currently devel-
oping a "bulletin board" capability through which practitioners
should soon be able to access forms, cases and documents of inter-
est. The sheer volume of cases currently being written will make
word researches through all of them impractical, 9 but research
data bases of selected cases are likely to evolve, perhaps with
Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners making a selection
from among their own opinions for "publication", as the Federal
judiciary does. 0
86. The Commission's rules have gone through several format changes, which
your author attempted to trace by subject matter in a chart appended to
"Industrial Commission Rules & Practices", Workers' Compensation 1993, Wake
Forest School of Law (CLE).
87. J. Keech, Workmen's Compensation in North Carolina, 1929-1940, Duke
University Press (1942).
88. See Ballentyne, supra note 51.
89. With the assistance of "special deputies", the full Commission ran two
panels during 1994, as the expanded Commission has been able to continue to do,
and filed something over 600 full Commission decisions. Our current staff of
twenty Deputy Commissioners will probably file something over two thousand
decisions per year.
90. Like many other compensation boards and commissions in the U.S. and
Canada, and other agencies that deal with massive amounts of paperwork (the
Commission handles more records than any State agency other than the Dept. of
Revenue), the Commission is moving towards a "paperless file" electronic media
storage system. Funds were first appropriated for an optical disk system in
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Because the low amounts in controversy in earlier cases dis-
couraged precedent setting litigation, as well as the series of
benchmark cases in the late 1980's, 9 the Commission has dealt
with a large number of issues of first impression in applying the
law on a case-by-case basis in the early 1990's.92 Generally, these
issues took years to reach the courts, if at all, and the utility of
decisions on those that did have often been limited by the facts of
the particular case. As a consequence, Commission opinions have
sought more frequently to explain the legal basis for decisions.
This has had the desired effect of narrowing and refining the
issues over which parties have chosen to litigate. In the Deputy
Commissioners' decisions,93 the discussion is normally associated
with the conclusions of law, either in the paragraphs so denomi-
nated, following the conclusions per se, or preceding them in a sep-
arate "note" or "commentary". For most of the '90's, the Full
Commission decisions that included discussion appeared very
much the same as those published in the Depression-era official
reporters, with identification of parties and counsel, followed by a
discussion of the primary issue, 4 noting the significant facts and
the controlling and distinguishable statutes and case law, con-
1992, and it is anticipated that it will be operational by mid-to late 1995.
Statutory authority to reproduce documents from electronic media and use them
for all purposes like originals was granted in the 1991 amendments (see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-92(f) (Supp. 1994)), and augmented by references in the 1994 Act
(see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-81(a) and 97-92(a) (Supp. 1994)).
91. See Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 318 N.C. 89, 96-100, 348
S.E.2d 336, 341-42 (1986) (lifetime benefits for scheduled injuries); Gupton v.
Guilders Transp., 320 N.C. 38, 38, 357 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1987) (election between
permanent partial and wage loss benefits); Little, 317 N.C. at 212-13, 345 S.E.2d
at 210 (lifetime medicals); Bridges v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 90 N.C. App. 397, 399-
400, 368 S.E.2d 388, 390, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 104 (1988)
(vocational total disability). See also Ballentyne, supra note 51, at 79 and 88.
92. The number of requests for hearing more than doubled from fiscal year
1987 to 1992, and approximately thirty-nine percent of the Deputy
Commissioners' hearing decisions were appealed to the full Commission in the
latter year. Ballentyne, supra note 51, at xviii and 66.
93. An Opinion and Award rendered following section 97-84 hearing
proceedings looks generally like a court judgment, with some initial notes on
procedural history of the case and the documents submitted following the live
hearing before the Deputy (typically doctors' depositions and medical records),
the stipulations of the parties, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the award.
94. Particularly when a narrow audience was anticipated, brief comments of
this sort might only supplement the discussion in the Deputy's decision and the
parties' briefs, or seek to enlighten concerning one of several issues raised in the
case that the attorneys might see again.
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cluding with any modifications of the hearing officer's decision and
adoption by reference of the remainder. By volume, a majority of
the cases affirming the hearing Deputy were brief, per curiam-
style orders adopting it by reference. Until late 1993, the Com-
mission avoided tinkering with the Deputy's findings, even to cor-
rect syntax errors, to avoid the appearance of taking issue where
there was none, and to avoid imposing on its less than minimal
staff. 5 In response to an opinion by the Chief Judge of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, suggesting it would "enable this court
to better understand the Full Commission's opinion and award" if
findings were set out again in the Full Commission's decisions, the
Commission began incorporating the findings and conclusions
under review into its Opinion and Awards-typically verbatim,
unless a substantive change in the hearing Deputy's decision was
intended.9 6 This "Crump form" coincided with the acquisition of
95. When your author joined the Commission in February 1989, he and the
Chairman's clerk, with less than a year's experience, were the only attorneys
regularly involved with doing the Full Commission's work - although one of the
other two Commissioners had decades of experience with compensation law -
and was first furnished a clerk in December of 1993. The Commission was
expanded to seven (7) members (six of whom are attorneys) in October 1994, and
each share a clerk and a secretary. Compare Wisconsin, which has a similar rate
or frequency of litigation, but three-quarters (3/4) the population, whose three (3)
commissioners are assisted by 14 staff attorneys. D. Ballentyne, Workers'
Compensation in Wisconsin, WCRI, pp. 17 & 76 (1992).
96. See Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C. App. 587, 592, 436 S.E.2d
589, 593 (1993). This decision effectively disposed of the perceived doctrine of the
"yo-yo" cases, e.g., Hardin v. Venture Constr. Co., I.C. No. 712216, 107 N.C. App.
758, 421 S.E.2d 601 (1992);
Braswell v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., I.C. No. 706343, 106 N.C. App. 1, 8-
9, 415 S.E.2d 86 (1992) (concurrence); Faircloth v. North Carolina Dep't of
Transp., I.C. No. 755271, 106 N.C. App. 303, 416 S.E.2d 409 (1992); Vieregge v.
North Carolina State Univ., I.C. No. 536600, 105 N.C. App. 633, 414 S.E.2d 771
(1992). In Harden, one judge began militantly ignoring all findings of fact
adopted by reference by the full Commission, (without commenting on sixty-
three years of unbroken contrary practice), and suggested that having the
witnesses recapitulate their testimony before the full Commission would speed
up the disposition of cases appealed. See Hardin, 107 N.C. App. at 761, 421
S.E.2d at 604. These were mixed in with a dozen other decisions from that court
that reviewed Commission cases normally, and the anomalous viewpoint was
largely ignored, until it was cited as the basis for a Writ of Mandamus addressed
to the Commission. The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, had
remanded Johnson v. Standard Sunco, Inc., (referencing Commission findings of
fact in six places) with a remarkably overt suggestion that the Commission
rework its findings to support a different result. (It did not state the findings
were not supported by any evidence, or the law mandated a different result based
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equipment making it relatively easy to copy Deputy Commis-
sioner's decisions onto the full Commission's word processors for
manipulation and reprinting, and the prospect of being able to
conveniently store and retrieve Commission opinions on its "local
area network" (LAN) and a computer accessible "bulletin board",
where the "Crump form" gives researchers the advantage of han-
dling one "file" rather than two. But on occasion, particularly
when the Commission has modified the hearing officer's findings
or conclusions (which typically is noted), researching counsel may
find reading the Deputy's decision useful.
As both the number of cases at the Full Commission level and
the difficulty of conscientiously reviewing them has increased, so
has the temptation to omit discussion of the legal grounds for deci-
sions-abetted by the rationalization that the adjudication has an
"administrative" context in a traditionally informal and non-tech-
nical forum. As the promulgation of a "Reasoned Decisions Stan-
dard" by the International Association of Industrial Accident
Boards and Commissions (IAIABC) in 1992 attests, that is not
unique to North Carolina. As this document states:
[T]he absence of reasons in compensation decisions can "give the
appearance of erroneous or arbitrary decisions.... Predictability
is of critical importance, particularly in administrative law, for
attorneys and appellate and legislative bodies.... Attorneys can-
not adequately prepare for trial .... They are unable to point to
strengths or weaknesses in a case which might discourage false
claims or encourage meritorious awards.... A rationale describ-
ing why and how the decision was reached provides the basis for
appellate bodies to gauge the accuracy of decisions.... [W]ithout
reasons, lawmakers cannot understand why some laws may not be
applied in the manner anticipated .... It is important to the
administrative law process and the public it serves to ensure that
parties in similar situations will be treated not only fairly, but
equally."9 7
on the findings.) Johnson v. Standard Sunco, Inc., N.C. App. No. 9110IC711, 7
July 1992. When the Commission reached the same result, the mandamus was
issued "for the Court" (albeit, without knowledge of some, and perhaps most of its
members) stating the Commission had failed to make "any" findings of fact, and
citing the four yo-yo cases. I.C. No. 033019, 111 N.C. App. 926, 435 S.E.2d 536
(1993). The Raleigh paper took it literally, and screeched that the Commission
was defying the court. See Johnson v. Standard Sunco, Inc., I.C. No. 033019, 22
Oct. 1993 (dissent). Crump "explained" the "yo-yo" decisions, and no other party's
rights were prejudiced on review in the court due to adoption of findings by
reference. The new format memorializes the wisdom of the Crump decision.
97. The IAIABC, has a predominantly North American membership.
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Full Commission discussion of its legal grounds for decisions
has been as important in recent years as when the Act was new,
and often for the same reason.98 The appellate courts' reflections
on expressed views of Commissioners has helped produce particu-
larly meaningful and instructive case law.99
V. NECESSARY FINDINGS
Students of trial advocacy are often advised to begin their
preparations by listing those findings and conclusions it will be
necessary for them to prove or refute to achieve the result they
seek, and then to outline a theory of the case encompassing such a
showing with, and in spite of, the credible evidence and the rea-
sonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Counsel can save
themselves considerable effort, and possible assessment of attor-
ney's fees, 10 by stipulation to matters beyond reasonable dispute
that one party or the other will seek to prove.
As an example, consider how the stipulations might be drawn
in this scenario. Plaintiff has been employed for six years in an
occupation requiring the repetitive motion of her wrists. While
they have become achy from time to time, she has never lost time
from work or suffered any great physical distress. After becoming
pregnant, however, she develops numbness, tingling and pain in
both arms that wakes her up at night. Then, while riding in her
supervisor's car to the company's annual picnic and awards event
on March 1, 1994, another motorist runs a stop sign and strikes
their vehicle. She suffers a non-displaced fracture of the left arm
but is otherwise unhurt. Although the fracture heals without
complication, the employee's orthopaedist performs carpal tunnel
98. When the courts are called on to interpret new law or apply it in a new
context, "the Industrial Commission's legal interpretation of a particular
provision is persuasive, although not binding, and should be accorded some
weight on appeal. . .since that administrative body hears and decides all
questions arising under the Act." Deese v. Southern Lawn & Tree Expert Co.,
306 N.C. 275, 278, 293 S.E.2d 140 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Gupton v. Builders Transp., 320 N.C. 38, 39-40, 357 S.E.2d 674,
675 (1987); Jackson v. Dairymen's Creamery, 202 N.C. 196, 162 S.E. 359 (1932);
Craver v. Dixie Furniture, 115 N.C. App. 570, 576, 447 S.E.2d 789, 795 (1994);
Parker v. Union Camp Corp., 108 N.C. App. 85, 87, 422 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1992);
Church v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 104 N.C. App. 411, 416, 409 S.E.2d 715, 719
(1991); Laughinghouse v. State Ports Ry Comm'n, 101 N.C. 375, 377, 399 S.E.2d
587, cert. denied, 328 N.C. 732, 404 S.E.2d 871 (1991); Pollard v. Krispy Waffle
#1, 63 N.C. App. 354, 357, 304 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1983).
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-88.1 (1991).
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release surgery on both wrists to relieve her debilitating pain,
which he attributes to her work activities, and possibly to the
trauma to her hands when she extended them to protect herself at
impact during the motor vehicle accident. The employer admits
liability for injuries received in the motor vehicle accident, 10 1 and
pays benefits in respect to the fracture, but denies the carpal tun-
nel syndrome diagnosed by plaintiff's physician was work related,
or if it was, the plaintiff remains unable to work. 10 2 The stipula-
tions (in italics) entered into by the parties prior to the hearing to
resolve plaintiff's claim might read as follows:
1. At all times pertinent hereto, the defendant-employer regu-
larly employed three or more employees and was subject to the Act,
and Mutual of Omagosh insured its compensation risk. This cov-
ers the requisite jurisdictional finding. The compensation carrier
is itself a defendant in compensation cases.10 3
2. The plaintiff was injured by accident in the course and
scope of her employment on March 1, 1994. Proof of accident and
injury are separate matters. °4
3. The Form 21 Agreement approved by the Commission on
March 18, 1994 is incorporated herein by reference. This form
agreement is normally the first admission of liability, and estab-
lishes some factual particulars. 0 5 Once approved by the Commis-
sion, an agreement is tantamount to an award, 0 6 and can be set
aside only upon proof of "fraud, misrepresentation, undue influ-
ence or mutual mistake."0 7
4. Defendant paid compensation at the rate of $434.55 for six
and 4 / 7 weeks, and its lien arising from those payments was satis-
101. Concerning employer liability for "recreation" injuries, see Chilton v.
Bowman Gray School of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 14-18, 262 S.E.2d 347, 348-
49, (1980), and for injuries while being transported in employers' vehicles, see
Enroughty v. Black Indus., Inc., 13 N.C. App. 400, 405, 185 S.E.2d 597, 600, cert.
denied, 280 N.C. 421, 186 S.E.2d 923 (1972).
102. For an excellent discussion of carrying and shifting the burden of proof of
continuing disability following maximum medical improvement, see Russell v.
Lowes Product Distrib., 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 S.E.2d 454 (1993).
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-98 (1991); Hardin v. Venture Constr. Co., I.C.
No. 712216, 1 May 1991.
104. See Bigelow v. Tire Sales Co., 12 N.C. App. 220, 222-23, 182 S.E.2d 856,
858 (1971).
105. See I.C. Form 21. For instance, the compensation rate may be
established, or determined preliminarily, subject to later verification.
106. See Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 258-59, 221 S.E.2d 355,
358 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991).
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fled when plaintiff's claim against the third-party tort-feasor
responsible for the accident was settled. Generally, the plaintiff
brings the suit against the third-party tort-feasor, and repays the
compensation defendants out of the proceeds (less an attorney fee)
for compensation paid "or to be paid" pursuant to an award or the
defendants admitted liability.1-0 Their lien does not extend to
plaintiff's recovery in respect to conditions for which defendants
liability has not been admitted or established at the time of the
judgment or settlement.'0 9
5. The plaintiff did not earn wages between March 1, 1994
and October 12, 1994, when she returned to work for the defend-
ant-employer for 1 § days at her former wages. Thereafter, she
began part-time employment again on November 10 at an average
weekly wage of $200.00 per week until the present. Such facts are
vital for specifying an award or disposition under various conclu-
sions, e.g.: if the Deputy Commissioner determines that the
employee was capable of remaining employed at former wages,
and thus was no longer disabled, or that she made a good faith
effort to obtain employment and was incapable of doing so," 0 or
that she is entitled to "temporary partial disability", the benefit
for diminution in the ability to earn wages, equal to 2/3 of the differ-
ence between the pre- and post-injury earnings."'
6. The parties agree that the issues to be determined are
whether plaintiff suffers from an occupational disease, and if so, to
what benefits is she entitled. Plaintiff might be more specific
about whether they intend to rely on the accident or the occupa-
tional disease theory of causation, and defendant might reveal
whether they expect to prove that the employment did not place
the plaintiff at increased risk of disease, or that the condition had
a purely "idiopathic" or non-work related cause. 112 Parties, how-
ever, are typically unwilling to stake themselves out with such
specificity before taking the depositions of the physicians that will
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1991) (regarding recovery and distribution
of damages from a third party liable to the compensation parties in tort for
causing the injury).
109. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(f)(1) (1991); Radzisz v. Harley Davidson of
Metrolina, Inc., I.C. No. 048337, 13 Dec. 1994.
110. See Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 765-66, 425 S.E.2d at 457 (1993).
111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (1991).
112. Concerning proof of occupational diseases per N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13)
(1991)- that is, maladies not listed by name in that section- see generally
Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 293 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
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render the medical causation opinions, which typically are vital to
the outcome. 113
In many cases, other matters determinable from business and
medical records that would significantly ameliorate the defend-
ants' liability can be stipulated at defendants' initiative. An
employee who had a pre-existing impairment, and was rendered
totally disabled by the subject injury, may be entitled to receive
benefits primarily from the Second Injury Fund.114 Employer-
financed disability benefits paid while the employer contests lia-
bility may be offset against an eventual award, 1 5 if the necessary
facts and circumstances are shown.
In many cases, "medical compensation" is the most valuable
benefit. However, since all of the extensive set of services falling
within the definition 6 which would "effect a cure or give relief
and ... will tend to lessen the period of disability" for the claimant
are automatically available upon proof or admission of liability,
with only narrow grounds for forfeiture,"' 7 it is not normally a
topic for stipulation. Within that definition, "rehabilitation" has
been considered to include such things as specially modified vehi-
cles and dwellings for paraplegics. However, interpretations of
the term cannot be stretched beyond its conventional realm of
enabling or facilitating life activities."18
113. See Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d
389, 391 (1980) (concerning when such an expert medical opinion on causation is,
and is not, necessary).
114. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-40.1 (Supp. 1994). But the fund is liable only if
it is capable of paying the benefit. Changes in assessments were necessary in
both the 1991 amendments and the 1994 Act to restore the Fund to solvency.
115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §. 97-42 (Supp. 1994); Foster v. Western-Electric Co.,
320 N.C. 113, 117-18, 357 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1987); Estes v. North Carolina State
Univ., 102 NC. App. 52, 58, 401 S.E.2d 384, 390 (1991); Martin v. Channel
Master, I.C. No. 208325, 14 Feb. 1995. The statute was amended by the 1994 Act
to specify the method of calculating the offset in light of Evans v. AT&T
Technologies, 329 N.C. 787, 408 S.E.2d 519 (1991). For a similar scheme, see the
credit for unemployment benefits per N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-42.1 (1991).
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(19) (Supp. 1994). For the origin of this
definition, see infra note 9.
117. The Commission may order suspension of benefits while a claimant
refuses to accept appropriate treatment or rehabilitation, refuses statutorily
authorized examinations or refuses suitable employment. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-
25, 97-27(a), and 97-32 (1991); Watkins v. City of Asheville, I.C. 623502, 8 May
1989, aff'd, 99 N.C. App. 302, 392 S.E.2d 754 (1990).
118. See your author's dissent in Grantham v. Cherry Hosp., I.C. No. 504381, 1
June 1989, rev'd, 98 N.C. App. 34, 389 S.E.2d 822, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 138, 394
S.E.2d 454 (1990) (payment of consumer debt, although it would give mental
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VI. JURISDICTION OF PARTIES
Many states' workers' compensation laws initially allowed
employers to elect not to be covered ("reject the Act"), and remain
subject to tort suits for their employees' injuries, but without the
common law defenses of contributory negligence and the "fellow
servant rule" that generally immunized employers for the inter-
vening negligence of the claimant's co-employees. Most states,
including North Carolina in 1935,119 have repealed these
deplorable provisions with the notable exceptions of South Caro-
lina and Texas. 120 New Jersey also allows employers to exempt
themselves from the Act, but this is notable only as proof that
their compensation system has succeeded in reducing costs for
employers. The condition of the exemption is that the employer
buy liability insurance for their workplace injuries, and not a sin-
gle employer in the State does so.
12 1
Today, in general, all North Carolina employers with three or
more employees are subject to the obligations and benefits of the
Act, 122 and required to obtain insurance or qualify to self-insure
their liabilities imposed by the Act. 123 When determining the
number of employees, proprietors and partners are excluded, and
corporate officers included (because the corporation is the
"employer"), but they all may choose whether or not to be covered
and charged premium for coverage in their policy of insurance. 1
24
Failure to do so is a misdemeanor, and may result in civil penal-
ties of one hundred dollars a day against the company and a levy
against the responsible officer or owner equal to the value of com-
pensation benefits due. 125
"relief", not authorized). A commentator called the Commission majority's
holding "perhaps the most imaginative effort on record to stretch the term."
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, § 61.13(a).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10 was repealed, and the exclusive remedy provision
restated in a new section 97-10.1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991).
120. These provisions tend to give financially irresponsible employers a
competitive advantage over the others at the expense of injured employees and
the taxpayers who finance the "social safety net" into which the disabled often
fall.
121. See E. Nordman, "Alternatives to Traditional Workers' Compensation
Coverage," National Assoc. of Insurance Commissioners/IAIABC Joint
Committee on Workers' Compensation (draft paper) (1995).
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(1) (Supp. 1994).
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-93 (Supp. 1994).
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (Supp. 1994).
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-94 (Supp. 1994).
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The exceptions to the "three or more" employee rule exempt
agricultural employments with less than ten "full-time non-sea-
sonal" employees, and an individual operating a sawmill with less
than ten employees for less than sixty days during any six month
period "whose principal business is unrelated to sawmilling or log-
ging"; but subjects to the Act any employment that exposes even
one employee to "the use or presence of radiation".126 Employees
specifically exempted from coverage are railroads workers (com-
pensated under federal law), "casual employees, farm laborers 127
when fewer than ten full-time non-seasonal farm laborers are reg-
ularly employed by the same employer, federal government
employees .. and domestic servants." 28
North Carolina has no cases interpreting the radiation
phrase, but since the common light bulb disperses some radiation,
to keep this exception from swallowing the rule, it is likely to be
found applicable only to instrumentalities whose purpose or by-
product is the creation of enough radiation that an accident with it
would put an employee at an unconventional risk of a radiation
injury. In 1993, your author solicited the opinion of the North
Carolina Radiation Protection Commission on occupations that
would meet that criteria. They concluded the covered employees
would be those who are required by law and regulations to receive
special training because of such risks. Thus a tanning bed opera-
tor or a nurse who assisted a radiologist with positioning patients
and taking x-rays would be considered "in the use and presence of
radiation", but a receptionist at those workplaces would not.129
However, if there is a single radiation employee, all the employees
of the business must be covered.
Prisoners who are injured while performing work assigned by
the Department of Correction-who are not "employees" because
their work is involuntary 13 0- are given limited compensation by
a special provision of the Act.' 3 1 Despite a reference to the exclu-
126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(1) (Supp. 1994).
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1991). For the distinction between "farm
labor" under this statute and "agricultural labor" per section 97-2(1), see Hinson
v. Creech, 286 N.C. 156, 158, 209 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1974).
128. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1991).
129. These scientists also volunteered that this was a preposterous basis for
distinction, and indeed, I have seen more injuries during my tenure from
exploding urinals (one) than radiation.
130. See Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 248
N.C. 276, 279-80, 103 S.E.2d 366, 369 (1958).
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991).
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sive remedy section of the Act, they have also been allowed to sue
the state for negligence under the State Tort Claims Act.' 3 2 This
is currently under challenge for the first time in 35 years.133
Volunteer firemen, rescue squad members, auxiliary police
officers and "senior members of the State Civil Air Patrol" injured
in the course and scope of their duties are entitled to compensa-
tion, with their benefits calculation based on income from their
regular jobs.13 4
Notwithstanding the exclusions, any employer may elect to
subject itself and its employees to the Act by purchasing workers'
compensation insurance coverage. 13 5 Many sole proprietors, pri-
marily motivated by the desire for personal coverage or to meet a
general contractor's requirements for taking a subcontract, will
buy a policy for "miscellaneous" or "occasional" labor and elect to
cover themselves. Despite the farm labor exclusion, many farmers
comply with federal migrant protection legislation by purchasing
coverage for their seasonal work crews. 1 36
A person or firm that undertakes a contract with a party to
perform work, and lets a subcontract to do a portion of the work to
a third person or firm, is thereby generally liable under the Act for
injuries sustained by the subcontractor or its employees in the
course and scope of that work 137- a status characterized as "stat-
utory employer".'13 While this section applies to all subcontracts,
that business arrangement tends to be associated with construc-
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 143, art. 31.
133. See Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 620, 114 S.E.2d
812, 815-16 (1960); Oxendine v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections, I.C. No. TA-
12513, 16 Dec. 1992; Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections, I.C. No.
TA-12025, 15 Mar. 1994, and, Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections,
I.C. No. TA-12230, 31 Mar. 1994, presently pending before the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, presenting this issue.
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (Supp. 1994).
135. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1991).
136. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1841(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1984).
137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (Supp. 1994).
138. LARSON, supra note 82, at § 49.00. The principal contractor referenced in
the statute should not be confused with the person or firm licensed as a
construction "contractor" per N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-1 (1991), although the latter's
activities frequently bring it under section 97-19. But such a firm that develops
its own property for sale, without any prior contractual obligation to perform the
work, is not. See Mayhew v. Howell, 102 N.C. App. 269, 273, 401 S.E.2d 831,
833-34, aff'd, 330 N.C. 113, 408 S.E.2d 853 (1991); Postell v. B & D Constr. Co.,
I.C. No. 838618, 4 May 1990, aff'd, 105 N.C. App. 1, 8, 411 S.E.2d 413, 419
(1992).
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tion and some other comparatively risky occupations. Its purpose
is to "protect the employees of financially irresponsible subcon-
tractors who do not carry compensation insurance", and avoid the
specter of large projects being carried out by a crew atomized into
business entities with less than three employees to avoid the sub-
stantial overhead cost of compensation insurance. 139
The principal contractor is relieved of this duty if, at the time
the subcontractors let, he obtains a certificate140 showing the sub-
contractor has purchased coverage for its employees. In addition,
a subcontractor without employees may sign a waiver of his right
to coverage and relieve both parties to the subcontract of the obli-
gation to insure. 14  Some self-insurance pools of construction
trades employers require their members not accept waivers
because of the risk the "sub" will actually have or later get
employees on the job-the conventional wisdom being that such
employees' rights to compensation from the general contractor
would not be affected by the waiver.' 4 ' The standard insurance
policies, approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, do not per-
mit insurance carriers to refuse waivers. Note that it is the con-
tractual arrangement, and not any number of employees, that
brings parties to subcontracts within the purview of the Act.
Licensing requirements for firms permitted to operate inter-
state truck freight businesses require that the licensee maintain a
degree of control over the drivers operating under that license
that, in common law, implies an employer/employee relationship.
Consequently, for reasons of public policy, the law requires a firm
licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to operate
an interstate freight trucking business assure that all its driv-
ers-including employees of independent businesses leasing
trucks to the ICC licensee, or "owner/operators" themselves-are
covered by workers' compensation insurance. 143 However, since
these parties contract at arms-length for the use of the truck and
its driver, they can, and frequently do, contract for the truck's
owner/operator will purchase compensation coverage, notwith-
standing the prohibition on requiring employees to bear the costs
139. See Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 434, 53 S.E.2d 668, 673 (1949).
140. Issued by the carrier or self-insurance section of the Department of
Insurance, a practice legitimized by the 1991 amendments. See Plummer v.
Kearney, 108 N.C. App. 310, 312, 423 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1992).
141. Per 1989 amendment.
142. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6 (1991).
143. See Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652, 658, 118 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1961).
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of their compensation coverage.'4 There has been litigation over
whether a compensation insurance carrier insuring only the liabil-
ity of the ICC licensee must pay compensation for an injury sus-
tained by an owner/operator in the course of preparing a leased
truck to travel, turning on whether the claimant was performing
maintenance in his capacity as the owner/lessor of the vehicle, or
as the driver/employee of the ICC licensee. 145
When an employee is under the concurrent control of two
employers, both "joint" employers are liable for compensation due
the employee. ("Joint employment" should not be confused with
"dual employment" or the "lent employee" situation, wherein the
employers have consecutive control and no common interest in the
work performed at the time of the injury. 146) By statute, joint
employers are to "contribute to the payment of such compensation
in proportion to their wages liability to such employee,"1 47 and, in
the absence of any contractual arrangements, the court has
assessed the dual employers for half each. ' 48 However, the section
contains a proviso that the joint employers may enter into "any
reasonable arrangement... for a different distribution as between
themselves of the ultimate burden of compensation." In the most
common joint employment arrangements today-temporary agen-
cies that pay and direct employees to client firms, who then con-
trol the performance of the employee's labor-the conventional
form contract provides that the agency will pay for all required
insurance, as well as wages, withholding, etc., in return for its
fee. 149 "Employee leasing" companies, which are legally similar
but on a larger scale, have become notorious in other parts of the
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6 (1991); Watkins, 253 N.C. at 660, 118 S.E.2d at
13-14.
145. E.g., Thompson v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 32 N.C. App. 693, 697-98, 236
S.E.2d 312, 314 (1977); Thompson v. Southwestern Freight Carriers, I.C. No.
314661, 16 Feb. 1995.
146. See Collins v. James Paul Edwards, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 455, 459, 204
S.E.2d 873, 876, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 589, 206 S.E.2d 862 (1994).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-51 (1991).
148. See Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford Co., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 408, 414,
319 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1984).
149. Unfortunately, Henderson has occasionally been misread by carriers to
mean that they should be able to collect back half of compensation paid from the
client firm with whom the injury occurred. There was no discussion of section 97-
51 in that case because, as its record on appeal shows, officers of both employers
testified that there was no written agreement or even oral discussion of who
would purchase compensation coverage, and the court focused on the employer's
relative obligations to pay under those circumstances. See Jackson v. Blue Ridge
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country for failing to arrange coverage, collapsing financially, and
leaving the client employer liable and employees with uncertain
prospects of collecting compensation. While the referenced sec-
tion allows parties to arrange payment of their joint liability "as
between themselves", the employee retains the right to seek all of
it from either party,1 5 0 whether they are prepared to pay it or not.
Employers entering into employee leasing arrangements would be
well advised to retain and fulfill the employer's obligation to
purchase compensation insurance, or withhold premium from the
contract price and pay it themselves, or monitor their contractor's
compliance carefully.
The anecdotal evidence suggests the rising cost of workers'
compensation insurance has been accompanied by an increase in
the number of employers subject to the Act going non-insured.151
Premiums actually billed employers increased an average of 144%
from 1987 through 1993. Unlike many other states, North Caro-
lina has no fund to pay compensation to a non-insured employee,
who may seek the assets of the employer itself.1 52 The 1994 Act
significantly augmented existing sanctions1 53 against non-insured
employers, with changes notably including a one hundred percent
penalty assessable personally against an officer of the employer
who willfully fails to obtain coverage, and a requirement that the
employer report their carrier and policy number along with their
employer tax returns.15 4 Due to unfair competition from unin-
Temporaries, I.C. No. 071377, 16 Oct. 1991; Hyatt v. Temporary Employee Serv.,
Inc., I.C. No. 073669, 28 Sept. 1992.
150. See Henderson, 70 N.C. App. at 413, 319 S.E.2d at 694.
151. A concurrent problem has been the underreporting of "all injuries" -
traditionally defined as one serious enough to require a physician's attention off
the workplace premises - as required by section 97-92(a). Reports of "medical
only" claims have fallen by 60,000 in recent years, presumably due to employers
trying to avoid the adverse effect on the "experience modification" formula that
sets their premium rate according to risk.
152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-87 (1991); Bryant v. Poole, 261 N.C. 553, 556,
135 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1994); Champion v. Vance County Bd. of Health, 221 N.C.
96, 100-101, 19 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1942). If the employee can prove negligence,
he or she may elect to pursue the employer in superior court. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-94(b) (Supp. 1994) and 97-9 (1991). The employee also has the right to use
attachment and other ancillary remedies, although it has no special utility in
non-insured cases, as the statute has been interpreted; Nelson v. Hayes, 116
N.C. App. 632, 636-37, 448 S.E.2d 848, 850-51 (1994).
153. See Ellerbe v. Karel Co., I.C. No. 279478, 3 Aug. 1993.
154. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-93(d) and 97-94 (Supp. 1994), and 105-163.7(c)
(1993).
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sured contractors bidding for jobs with lower overhead, as well as
concern for non-insured workers, the Legislature enacted a
requirement in 1992 that building inspectors check proof of cover-
age prior to issuing building permits.155 A non-insured employer's
appeal from an award of the Full Commission does "not act as a
supersedeas and the plaintiff in such case shall have the... right
to issue execution or to satisfy the award from the property of the
employer pending the appeal" to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. 156
VII. JURISDICTION OF CLAIMS
The Act provides that the Commission shall determine, "All
questions arising under this Article ... except as otherwise herein
provided." 157 This includes all matters directly affecting the right
to receive or the duty to pay benefits, and this "ordinarily includes
the right and duty to hear and determine questions of fact and law
respecting the existence of insurance coverage and liability of the
insurance carrier."158 While the Commission routinely gives
defendants credit for overpayment of benefits against their liabil-
ity for future payments,' 5 9 and the question of whether there has
been an overpayment is solely for the Commission, the Commis-
sion does not have jurisdiction to order a claimant to repay
benefits. 6 '
The Act provides the exclusive remedy 16 1 for workplace inju-
ries suffered under compensable circumstances, 6 2 unless it
results from the intentional or willful, wanton, and reckless negli-
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-14, amended effective July 6, 1992 by S.B. 719,
1991 N.C. SESS. LAws ch. 840, 152.
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Supp. 1994).
157. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-91 (1991).
158. See Greene v. Spivey, 236 N.C. 435, 445, 73 S.E.2d 488, 496 (1952). This
does not extend to whether a contract of insurance should be reformed to show
coverage when the plaintiff has not sought to hold the carrier liable and "the
rights of the employee were not involved." Clark v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 261
N.C. 234, 240, 134 S.E.2d 354, - (1964); North Carolina Chiropractic Assoc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 89 N.C. App. 1, 6, 365 S.E.2d 312, 317 (1988).
159. Mackey v. Providence Designer Homes, I.C. No. 221195, 4 Jan. 1995.
160. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rushing, 36 N.C. App. 226, 243 S.E.2d 420 (1978);
Neese v. Hickerson's Cable Installation, I.C. No. 924798, 15 Apr. 1992.
Judgment and execution based on the Commission's orders to pay must be
pursued through the court, in any case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-87 (1991).
161. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-9 and 97-10.1 (1991).
162. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (Supp. 1994) and § 97-53(13) (1991).
470 [Vol. 17:443
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss3/3
1995] PRIMARY IssuEs IN COMPENSATION LITIGATION 471
gence of a co-employee, 163 or the employer's intentional miscon-
duct undertaken with knowledge that it is substantially certain to
cause serious injury or death to employees.' 64 However, injuries
intentionally inflicted on the employee are "accidental" from the
point of view of the employee,' 6 5 and within the meaning of the
Act, i.e., "an unlooked for and untoward event which is not
expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury,"166 and
the employee may simultaneously pursue tort and compensation
remedies.' If a timely compensation claim is found not to be
within the Commission's jurisdiction, the'claimant may refile in
the Courts within one (1) year of the dismissal, but there is no
mirror provision for claims erroneously filed in the courts. 68
In addition to accidents occurring within the State, employees
may pursue claims here if their contract for hire was made in the
State, 16 9 if their employer is headquartered here, or if they are
based here, such as airline crews and interstate truckers associ-
ated with a terminal within the State. 70
The employee must see that the employer' 7 ' has prompt
notice of the accident' 7 2 - by written notice, if it does not have
actual knowledge-to facilitate investigation and prompt treat-
ment to mitigate the loss. 17 The employee is required to give
written notice within thirty days of the accident, unless the
employee can satisfy to the Commission that there was a good rea-
163. Pleasants v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 716-17, 325 S.E.2d 244, 248-49
(1985).
164. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 340, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (1991).
For a contemporaneous discussion of this benchmark decision and its context, see
"Caselaw Update", Workers' Compensation in North Carolina, Lorman Educ.
Services, (CLE, October 18, 1991).
165. See Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972).
166. See Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266,
268 (1930
167. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
168. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(b) (Supp. 1994).
169. Thomas v. Overland Express, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 90, 97, 398 S.E.2d 921,
926 (1990), discretionary review denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1991).
171. Notice to the employer "shall be deemed notice or knowledge.. .on the part
of the insurer...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-97 (1991).
172. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-22 (1991).
173. Jones v. Lowe's Cos., 103 N.C. App. 73, 76, 404 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1991).
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son for not giving earlier notice, and that the employer and carrier
have not been prejudiced. 174
As a condition precedent 175 to the employee's right to ask the
Commission to compel the employer and its insurer to pay com-
pensation, the employee must file a timely "claim". Absent a Com-
mission award (i.e., an order to pay benefits or an agreement
approved by the Commission), 176 the claimant must file the claim
with the Commission within two (2) years following the acci-
dent 177 or-effective January 1, 1995 and applicable to "claims
pending on or filed after that date"1 78 - within two years of the
last payment of compensation. 1 79 Unless there is a Commission
award for occupational disease claims, these periods run from the
latter of lost time due to the disease or advice from "competent
medical authority" that the disease was contracted due, at least in
significant part, to workplace exposure. Asbestosis, silicosis and
lead poisoning are excluded from the initial notice requirement.18 0
The time for giving notice and filing a claim are tolled by a
claimant's minority or incompetency if he or she has no guardian
or other personal representative.18 '
In practice, the need for notice is normally met by the
employer's actual knowledge of the accident occurring in its facil-
ity before other employees.'8 2 When circumstances make a writ-
ten notice necessary, it can be given with the Commission's Form
18 "Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee or His
Personal Representative or Dependents".
Claimants typically satisfy the requirement that a "claim" be
filed with the Commission with the Industrial Commission's Form
18, or Form 33, "Request that Claim Be Assigned for Hearing".
While the "claim" requirement may be met by a simple, informal
174. This may include the claimant's failure to appreciate the seriousness of
the injury. See Lawton v. County of Durham, 85 N.C. App. 589, 591, 355 S.E.2d
158, 160 (1987); Jones, 103 N.C. App. at 75, 404 S.E.2d at 166.
175. Winslow, 211 N.C. at 582, 191 S.E. at 412.
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994); Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 258, 221 S.E.2d
at 358.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a) (1991) (prior to 1994 amendment).
178. 1994 N.C. SESSION LAWS ch. 679, XI, § 11.1(0.
179. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-24(a) and 97-47.1 (Supp. 1994).
180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-58 and 97-52 (1991); Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills,
Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 706, 304 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1983).
181. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-50 (1991).
182. See Chilton v. Bowman Gray Sch. of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 18, 262
S.E.2d 347, 350 (1980).
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letter, it must be from the plaintiff or their counsel, and use the
term "claim" or request a hearing or otherwise express a desire or
intention to seek the Commission's intervention to compel pay-
ment of benefits. The defendants' compliance with the require-
ment that it file a Form 19 Report of Injury1 3 most definitely does
not obviate this requirement. 1 4 Other conduct and indications of
a desire to obtain benefits-including negotiations between coun-
sel-have been held insufficient. 8 5 Prior to the 1994 Act, pay-
ment of bills for medical compensation or cash compensation in
the absence of an award or admission of liability, would not suffice
to give the Commission jurisdiction.1 8 6 Thus the most dangerous
malpractice trap in compensation litigation is set: Counsel may
be retained by a claimant with a file full of letters from adjusters,
copies of forms filed with the Commission bearing a file number,
and a history of employer payment of medical and even cash bene-
fits, and proceed to investigate and negotiate about the case until
the two years slips by.
A series of notable changes in very recent years is ameliorat-
ing this very old problem.' 8 7 Claimants have received relief from
such mistakes on an equitable estoppel theory in egregious cases
of being lulled into inaction by defendant's representations, 8 and
more recently for more conventional misrepresentation. 9 A 1994
case may signal a more dramatic shift to considering the totality
of the circumstances affecting plaintiffs' actions when estoppel is
183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-92(a) (Supp. 1994). The requirement
encompasses alleged injuries and submission and reporting is not considered an
admission by the employer of liability or even that an accident or injury occurred.
184. Perdue v. Daniel Intl, 59 N.C. App. 517, 518, 296 S.E.2d 845, 846 (1982),
cert. denied, 307 N.C. 577, 299 S.E.2d 647 (1983).
185. Gantt v. Edmos Corp., 56 N.C. App. 408, 410, 289 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1982);
Reinhardt v. Women's Pavilion, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 83, 86, 401 S.E.2d 138, 139-
40 (1991).
186. Id.; Barham v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., 15 N.C. App. 519, 521, 190
S.E.2d 306, 308 (1972); Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 663, 75 S.E.2d
777, 780 (1953).
187. See Collins v. Insight Cablevision of Lincolnton, I.C. No. 114528, 3 Feb.
1995.
188. Belfield v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 77 N.C. App. 332, 337, 335 S.E.2d 44, 47
(1985); Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, 308 N.C. 701, 716, 304 S.E.2d 215, 227 (1983).
189. Parker v. Thompson-Arthur Paving Co., I.C. No. 801271, 3 Oct. 1989,
aff'd, 100 N.C. App. 367, 371, 396 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (1990); Lauer v. Juvenile
Evaluation Center, I.C. No. 805366, 14 Feb. 1995.
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pled. °90 Effective July 1, 1992, the Commission began requiring
employers or their carriers to give the claimant a copy of the
Industrial Commission's Form 19, "Employer's Report of Injury to
Employee", bearing information on the notice and claim require-
ments. Most importantly, as noted above, the two-year period will
run from the last payment by the employer in cases "pending on or
filed after" January 1, 1995.191 These developments should dimin-
ish the stream of litigation coming out of this atypically technical
procedural issue of compensation law.
Because of the ongoing nature of a claimant's entitlement to
benefits, often tracking his or her changing medical condition, the
Commission retains jurisdiction to carry out its administrative
responsibilities, even while issues in the case pend on appeal in
the appellate courts.192 As in integral part of the judicial power
vested in the Commission, the Commission has the flexibility and
continuing jurisdiction to set aside its former judgments to correct
an injustice or make its orders comply with the law. 193
In the arena of medical compensation,19 4 the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to decide issues of appropriate treatment, 19 5
claims for payment by health care providers, 96 and challenges to
190. Craver v. Dixie Furniture, I.C. No. 771691, rev'd, 115 N.C. App. 570, 578-
80, 447 S.E.2d 789, 794-95 (1994). Compare Gantt, 56 N.C. App. 408, 289 S.E.2d
75 (1982).
191. Cautious counsel may wish to avoid relying on provisions of the '94 Act
that purport to effect pending cases, because it is likely at least some of them will
be challenged on the constitutional ground that they increased the burden of
vested liabilities. See Battle v. New Southern of Rocky Mount, I.C. No. 716256,
16 Feb. 1995. For several reasons, counsel would do well to make a habit of
sending a Form 18, showing the facts as plaintiff tells them, with their letter of
representation.
192. See Schofield v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 32 N.C. App. 508, 515, 232
S.E.2d 874, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 641, 235 S.E.2d 62 (1977); 43 N.C. 567, 573,
259 S.E.2d 338 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 299 N.C. 582, 264 S.E.2d 56
(1980).
193. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 139-40, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985);
McDowell v. Kure Beach, 251 N.C. 818, 824, 112 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1960).
194. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(19) (Supp. 1994).
195. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1991); Worley v. Pipes, 229 N.C. 465, 471, 50
S.E.2d 504, 508 (1948).
196. North Carolina Chiropractic Assoc., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
89 N.C. App. 1, 4, 365 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1988), cert. denied, 327 N.C. 431, 395
S.E.2d 686 (1990).
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the application of the Fee Schedule, 97 or to the Fee Schedule
itself. 198
As a part of the executive branch, the Commission probably
does not have the authority to decide the constitutionality of stat-
utes in workers' compensation cases. 199
VIII. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
Since whether a person is disabled and, typically, how much
he or she is entitled to be compensated for an injury is determined
with reference to loss of wage earning capacity,200 a primary ques-
tion is how much the claimant was earning prior to the injury.
When defendants have admitted liability for any period of disabil-
197. Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 235, 128 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
198. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(a) (Supp. 1994); Wake Co. Hosp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 8 N.C. App. 259, 174 S.E.2d 292, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 117 (1970); but
see Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, 336
N.C. 200, 210, 443 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1994) (permiting providers to sue the
Commission under the Declaratory Judgment Act, decided before - and an
inspiration for - section 97-26(a)). The Charlotte-Mecklenburg court decided
that beginning litigation of the issue before the Commission offered plaintiffs an
inadequate remedy because their complaints would have to be raised in a real
case or controversy - i.e., one or more of the 8,000 inpatient bills submitted to
the Commission annually for approval. Without a real record, the court was left
to ruminate about levels of care in the 1920s and scenarios in which the employer
might pay less than the prevailing rate. Id. at 219-23. While the hospitals
financed preferred provider discount contracts with payors who had bargaining
power with the help of profits from charges to compensation defendants that
exceeded the next highest charged payors - commercial insurers - by 10% to
25% (N.C. Medical Database Commission (FY 1992)), by various measures.
Ironically, the per diem system that the court found exceeded the Commission's
statutory authority was the more generous alternative to the regular Fee
Schedule but the superior court had enjoined the abolition of its predecessor ("the
BCBSNC rule") obtained a month after plaintiffs had injured their prospects by
obtaining an injunction against the per diem rule. By the time the supreme
court found the second injunction improper eighteen months later, it had cost
employers well into eight (8) figures. Id. at 228; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-260;
R.C. PRO. R. 65(e). Affidavit of Commissioner Ward, 8 Jan. 1993. As they were
not parties to the DJA, employers had no recourse to recover these losses.
199. Battle v. New Southern of Rocky Mount, I.C. No. 716256, 16 Feb. 1995;
Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Utility Customer's Assoc., Inc., 336 N.C. 657, 674,
446 S.E.2d 332 (1994); but see Heavner v. Town of Lincolnton, II IC 213 (1931),
aff'd, 202 N.C. 400, 162 S.E. 909 (1932), appeal dismissed, 287 U.S. 672 (1932).
It probably can when "constituted a court" to hear State Tort Claims Act cases.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1994); Oxendine v. North Carolina Dep't of
Corrections, I.C. No. TA-12513, 16 Dec. 1992.
200. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (Supp. 1994).
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ity, it is normally stipulated, either with a specific figure, or by
reference to a either a Form 21201 or Form 26202 agreement that
contains this information. Once approved by the Commission-
thus becoming a Commission award 20 1 - the parties cannot con-
tradict it without showing that it was entered into due to fraud,
mistake or undue influence.2 °4 However, claimants frequently
sign an initial Industrial Commission Form 21 like a receipt for
their first check for compensation, and the employer's personnel
office may simply multiply forty hours times the claimant's hourly
rate, not taking into account overtime, vacation pay, etc. To pre-
vent manifest injustice and encourage prompt payment of benefits
due, the full Commission has taken the position that, if payroll
records show conclusively that the form is mistaken, the agree-
ment misrepresenting actual earnings to the Commission neces-
sarily portrays a mutual mistake (or worse), and therefore can be
set aside.2 °5 More sophisticated parties who have inadequate
information will agree to put in an estimated figure "subject to
wage verification," and execute the agreement rather than delay
payment. The latest revision of the Industrial Commission Form
21 provides the average weekly wage ("AWW") figure is "subject to
wage verification" unless otherwise indicated.
Methods for determining a claimant's AWW are set out in the
statute in order of preference.2 °6 The claimant's "average weekly
wage" is normally determined by dividing all income received from
the employer 20 7 during the preceding year by fifty-two (52).208
201. "Agreement for Compensation for Disability", used in respect to the initial
period of disability suffered due to an injury.
202. "Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement as to Payment of
Compensation", used for second or subsequent periods of total disability, and for
agreements concerning payment of permanent partial, temporary partial, or
total disability benefits.
203. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1991); Pruitt v. Knight Publishing, 289 N.C.
254, 258, 221 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1976).
204. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991).
205. Johnson v. Goodmark Corp., I.C. No. 077324, 22 Dec. 1993; Storey v.
Barnhill, I.C. No. 935286, 23 Nov. 1992.
206. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (Supp. 1994).
207. Only wages from the employment in which the claimant is injured is
considered - with tragic results when that is part-time employment, and the
claimant is rendered incapable of doing his or her primary job. See Barnhardt v.
Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 486 (1976).
208. For instructions on calculating the AWW by this method, see the
instructions on the Industrial Commission's Form 22 "wage chart", a/k/a,
"Statement of Days Worked and Earnings of Injured Employee", and Workers'
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The statute specifies different approaches to determining AWW
when the employment has lasted less than fifty-two weeks, subject
to considerations of fairness to both the employer and employee.
There has been considerable litigation over average weekly wages
in cases in which the preferred formula did not apply, notably
including claimants who had a promotion while serving the same
employer 20 9 within a year of the injury, and proprietors who, as
subcontractors, have become "statutory employees" pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 97-19, but have no regular pattern of "wages".21 0 The
statute also specifies special methods when the AWW is being cal-
culated for a minor, and for volunteer firemen, auxiliary police,
and senior members of the State Civil Air Patrol.
IX. COMPENSATION RATE
The claimant's "compensation rate" - the dollar amount of
periodic cash or indemnity benefits - is normally two-thirds of
the injured employee's "average weekly wage" 211 as of the date of
the accident.2 12 However, all benefits payable weekly are subject
to a maximum figure equal to roughly 110% of the average wage of
employees subject to the unemployment compensation system, as
calculated annually by the Employment Security Commission.21 3
Some benefits are paid in lump sums without reference to earn-
ings. Benefits for a particular claimant may also be determined
Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rules 404 and 402
(West 1995).
209. Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 235 N.C. 471, 477, 70 S.E.2d 426, 430
(1952); Early v. Basnight & Co., 214 N.C. 103, 105-07, 198 S.E. 577, 579 (1938).
210. See Christian v. Riddle & Mendenhall Logging, I.C. No. 082860, 28 Oct.
1993, rev'd, 117 N.C. App. 261, 450 S.E.2d 510 (1994).
211. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (Supp. 1994); see also supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
212. Crews v. North Carolina Dep't of Trans., 103 N.C. App. 372, 375, 405
S.E.2d 595, 597 (1991); Wood v. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 644 and 650, 256
S.E.2d 692, 697 and 701 (1979). The date of "accident" for occupational diseases
is the date when the employee first begins losing wages due to the compensable
condition. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-52 and 97-54 (1991); Taylor v. Stevens &
Co., 300 N.C. 94, 98-99, 365 S.E.2d 144, 147-49 (1980); Booker v. Duke Medical
Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 483, 256 S.E.2d 189, 205 (1979). However, a claimant who
has been partially disabled and subsequently becomes totally disabled by the
compensable condition is subject to the maximum in effect on the date of total
disability. Peace v. J.P. Stevens Co., 95 N.C. App. 129, 131, 381 S.E.2d 798, 799
(1989); but see, Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, 308 N.C. 701, 713-15, 304 S.E.2d 215
(1983), reh'ing denied, 308 N.C. 681, 311 S.E.2d 590 (1984).
213. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1991).
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from post-injury capacity to earn, the severity of the physical
impairment apart from impact on earnings, or the number of
other claimants entitled to share in the award.
With few exceptions, cash benefits are paid for actual or con-
clusively presumed periods of "disability" - a term of art under
the Act defined as the inability to earn pre-injury wages-not
physical impairment, per se.4 During periods of total disability,
either temporary (TTD) or permanent (PTD), a claimant is enti-
tled to weekly payments at a compensation rate equal to two-
thirds (2/3) of his or her "average weekly wage".2 15
When the claimant has reached the end of the healing period
and "maximum medical improvement," 216 has some ability to earn
wages, but also retains some impairment, the claimant may elect
to receive compensation for his residual disability in one of two
forms.217 "Permanent partial disability" benefits ("PPD") are
based on a physician's percentage of impairment "rating" and the
schedule of benefits for loss of specific body parts. Claimants
receive two-thirds (2/3) of their average weekly wage for a specific
number of weeks,2 18 typically calculated by multiplying the treat-
ing physician's percentage of impairment figure (or the average of
two or more physicians' ratings, if they're close, consistent and
credible) times the number of weeks for total loss in the statute.
Sometimes the carrier agrees to pay out the total cash owed in
lump sum. The Commission can order that all or part be paid in a
lump sum to cover the employee's accumulated debt, or for other
good cause.219 As has been observed in many states, the degree of
certainty this method of calculation brings to the system encour-
ages settlements, and is one of the reasons North Carolina has
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (Supp. 1994); Bridges, 90 N.C. App. at 399-
401, 368 S.E.2d at 389-91 (inability to compete for jobs); Fayne v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc., 54 N.C. App. 144, 146, 282 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1981), cert. denied, 304
N.C. 725, 288 S.E.2d 380 (1982) (mental sequala).
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1991). That claimant receives wages in a "make-
work" job does not bar his or her claim for TD or PTD. Peoples v. Cone Mills
Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 440, 342 S.E.2d 798, 808 (1986).
216. Crawley, 31 N.C. App. at 288-89, 229 S.E.2d at 328-29, discretionary
review denied, 292 N.C. 467, 234 S.E.2d 2 (1977); Moretz v. Richard & Assoc.,
Inc., 74 N.C. App. 72, 74-75, 327 S.E.2d 290, 292-93 (1985), modified and aff'd,
316 N.C. 539, 342 S.E.2d 844 (1986).
217. Gupton v. Builders Transp., 320 N.C. 38, 38, 357 S.E.2d 674, 677-78
(1987).
218. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (Supp. 1994).
219. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-44 (1991); I.C. Form 31.
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perhaps the lowest rate of litigation in the country.2 2 0 For
residual impairment to organs not listed by name, the Commis-
sion is authorized to make an "equitable"221 lump sum award,
with a cap of $20,000.00.222 The Commission is authorized to
compensate disfigurement of the face and head or the body, with
limits of $20,000.00 and $10,000.00 respectively, 223 if it is so
repulsive that it will limit the employee's earning potential224 and
has not otherwise been compensated. 225 The dollar figure caps are
just that-and not the equivalent of the weeks of compensation
listed for total loss of portions of the body in N.C.G.S. § 97-31 -
and the Commission awards an appropriate sum, without multi-
plying these figures times a percentage of impairment.
Alternatively, the claimant who can return to work, but at
lower wages than he or she earned prior to the injury due to
residual impairment resulting from the compensable accident,2 2 6
may elect to receive benefits at a weekly compensation rate equal
to two-thirds (2/3) of the difference between pre-injury earnings and
post-injury capacity to earn wages, while this diminution in wages
continues, but not beyond three hundred weeks from the date of
the injury.227 There is a special provision for payment of 104
weeks of compensation to employees discovered in Dusty Trade
Program 228 examinations to be showing signs of early asbestosis
or silicosis and "ordered out of the dust".2 2 9
220. Nine and three-tenths percent (9.3%) of paid indemnity claims. The next
lowest is Wisconsin, with 9%. Ballentyne, supra note 51, at 75-76.
221. Key v. McLean Trucking, 61 N.C. App. 143, 146, 300 S.E.2d 280, 282
(1983).
222. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(24) (Supp. 1994).
223. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(21) and (22) (1991).
224. See Liles v. Charles Lee Byrd Legging Co., 309 N.C. 150, 156-57, 305
S.E.2d 523, 526 (1983).
225. See Thompson v. Frank IX & Sons, 33 N.C. App. 350, 355, 235 S.E.2d 250,
253 (1977), aff'd, 294 N.C. 358, 240 S.E.2d 783 (1978).
226. See Gaddy v. Kern, 17 N.C. App. 680, 683, 195 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1973).
227. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (1991); Brown v. City of Fayetteville, I.C. No.
824563, 29 Dec. 1993. Contrast this benefit to compensation for total disability
per N.C.G.S. § 97-29 based solely on average weekly wages - that is, on actual
pre-injury earnings. See Liles v. Faulkner Neon & Elec. Co., 244 N.C. 653, 658,
94 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1956). In theory, all benefits address diminished capacity to
earn. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (Supp. 1994); Peoples, 316 N.C. at 435, 342
S.E.2d at 804-05.
228. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-60 to 97-64 (1991).
229. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b) (1991).
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Death benefits are payable weekly at the rate of two-thirds
(2/) of the decedent's average weekly wage, divided equally among
those persons who, at the time of the death, were "wholly depen-
dent" on the employee; or if none, among those "partially depen-
dent"; or if none, the employee's surviving "next-of-kin".23 °
Decedent's widow 231 and minor children282 are conclusively pre-
sumed to be wholly dependent.2 33 Despite dicta to the contrary in
a leading case,23 4 it appears to be settled that the class of benefi-
ciaries becomes fixed according to their status "at the time of the
accident"23 5 or at the date of the decedent-employee's death.236
All qualifying beneficiaries obtain a vested right to the death ben-
efit, or their share of it, for a period of four hundred weeks follow-
ing the death, and the estate of a beneficiary that does not survive
throughout that period succeeds to their right to compensation.23 7
But a surviving spouse who, on the date of death, is unable to sup-
port themselves, continues to receive their benefits until death or
remarriage, 238 and a minor child will continue to receive benefits
beyond the four hundred week period until they attain their
majority.23 9 The Commission has operated on the assumption, not
yet tested in the courts, that benefits owed a minor child beyond
the initial four hundred weeks-to "be continued until such child
reaches the age of 18"-would terminate with the child's death,
230. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1991).
231. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(14) (Supp. 1994).
232. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12) (Supp. 1994).
233. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (1991).
234. See Deese, 306 N.C. at 279-80, 293 S.E.2d at 144 (suggesting a
reapportionment of the benefit among surviving beneficiaries if one of them dies
within four hundred weeks of the employee's death).
235. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-38 and 97-39 (1991); see also Chinault v. Floyd
S. Pike Elec. Contractors, 53 N.C. App. 604, 606, 281 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1981),
aff'd, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147 (1982) (minor child's portion not increased
after four hundred weeks); Deese, 306 N.C. at 281, 293 S.E.2d at 145 (no
reapportionment among dependents after four hundred weeks); Allen v.
Piedmont Transp. Serv., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 234, 236-38, 447 S.E.2d 835, 836
(1994).
236. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(10),(12),(13),(14), and (15) (Supp. 1994), and
97-40 (1991).
237. Hill v. Cahoon, 252 N.C. 295, 298-99, 113 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1960).
238. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1991); Cockrell v. Evans Lumber Co., 103
N.C. App. 359, 363, 407 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1991).
239. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1991); Caldwell v. Marsh Realty Co., 32 N.C.
App. 676, 681, 233 S.E.2d 594, 597, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E.2d 782
(1977).
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and the child's estate would not have a claim for the additional
benefits that would have been paid had the child survived.
Beneficiaries are the proper plaintiff's in a claim for compen-
sation death benefits, and not the decedent's estate or the owner of
the policy.24 ° Most litigation in this area concerns the "depen-
dent" status of claimants, particularly illegitimate children,2 4'
and whether the cause of death was related to the employment,242
including intoxication cases.243 When an employee dies in the
course and scope of his employment of uncertain causes, the plain-
tiff is aided by a rebuttable "presumption of compensability" that
the "death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the dece-
dent's employment, or both."244 The court stated that this pre-
sumption was fair because of the liberal construction of the Act,
the employer's superior knowledge of plans and occurrences in the
workplace, and access to reports of the medical examiner.245 In
that vein, the court might have also noted the employer's "right in
any case of death to require an autopsy."2
46
X. CONCLUSION
The workers' compensation system has largely succeeded in
reducing litigation and giving injured workers a "swift and sure
240. See Crawford v. General Ins. & Realty Co., 266 N.C. 615, 617, 146 S.E.2d
651, 653-54 (1966).
241. See Rogers v. University Motor Inn, 103 N.C. App. 456, 461-62, 405
S.E.2d 770, 773 (1971) (I.C. No. 729933, 3 May 1990) (parents versus estranged
widow); Winstead v. Derreberry, 73 N.C. App. 35, 41-43, 326 S.E.2d 66, 71 (1985)
(step-child).
242. See Roberts v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417, 421
(1988) (good Samaritan); Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 241, 188 S.E.2d
350, 355-56 (1972) (domestic shotting in workplace); Petty v. Associated Transp.,
276 N.C. 417, 426-28, 173 S.E.2d 321, 329 (1970) (suicide, defended as
intentional per N.C.G.S. § 97-12(3) (1991)); Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C.
435, 438-39, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868-69 (1963); Murray v. Associated Insurers, Inc.,
114 N.C. App. 506, 513-14, 442 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1994) (trip for business and
pleasure).
243. See Sidney v. Raleigh Paving & Patching, 109 N.C. App. 254, 258, 426
S.E.2d 426, 429 (1993); Lassiter v. Town of Chapel Hill, 15 N.C. App. 98, 101, 189
S.E.2d 769, 771 (1972) (trash truck mechanism); Johnson v. Charles Keck
Logging, I.C. No. 050761, 23 May 1994; Suggs v. Snow Hill Milling Co., I.C. No.
615498, 21 June 1988, aff'd, 100 N.C. App. 527, 531, 397 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1990).
244. See Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368, 368 S.E.2d 582, 584
(1988).
245. See Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 587.
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-27(a) (1991).
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remedy." Despite "crises" in many states over the last decade,
none has returned workplace injury claims to the liability system.
Compensation litigation is simpler due to elimination of the
"fault" burdens of proof and defenses. Innovation and a dramatic
increase in the Industrial Commission's resources have enabled
new quick and informal means of resolving cases. But the breadth
of the Act's coverage, its limitations, the variety of gainful activi-
ties, the interplay of a given individual's medical and vocational
circumstances, and the probability that the parties' rights and
duties will evolve with the claimant's medical condition, all create
possibilities for disputes and litigation-and the stakes today
tend to animate them. Counsel can avoid surprise and narrow the
issues with careful pre-hearing preparation and stipulations
regarding facts that are undisputed but necessary to determine
the claimant's right to compensation.
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